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ABSTRACT 
Distributed system management is concerned with the tasks needed to ensure that large distributed systems can 
function in accordance with the objectives of their users.  These objectives are typically set out in the form of 
policies which are interpreted by the system managers.  There are benefits to be gained by providing automated 
support for human managers, or actually automating routine management tasks.  In order to do this, it is 
desirable to have a model of policies as objects which can be interpreted by the system itself.  The model is 
summarised.   
It is clear that there is the potential for conflicts between policies.  These conflicts may be resolved informally by 
human managers, but if an automated system is to recognise them and resolve them appropriately it is necessary 
first of all to analyse the types of conflict which may occur.  We analyse the types of overlap which may occur 
between policies, and show that this analysis corresponds to several familiar types of policy conflict.  Some 
possible approaches to the prevention and resolution of conflicts are suggested, and this work is put into the 
context of other work on policies and related areas, including deontic logic. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper describes a model of policies for use in distributed system management, and analyses some possible 
forms of policy conflict in terms of the components of the model. 
1.1. Distributed System Management 
Large distributed processing systems are becoming increasingly important for organisations to manage their 
own activities and interact with others.  They typically consist of multiple interconnected networks and span the 
computer systems belonging to a number of different organisations.   
Active management, rather than fire-fighting when problems occur, is essential for systems of this kind for 
several reasons.  First, many organisations now depend upon distributed systems in order to function, and they 
have developed from supportive to operational roles, so there has to be a positive approach to ensuring that 
they function adequately.  Second, in many cases the system is not controlled from one central point, but has to 
be maintained by the cooperative effort of several independent managers.  Third, distributed systems are highly 
complex in several dimensions: they have diverse components supplied by diverse manufacturers; they may be 
distributed across wide geographical areas, across international boundaries, across different regulatory 
authorities and across time-zones; they may contain hundreds of thousands of resources and be used by 
thousands of users. 
Distributed system management can be defined briefly as the task of maintaining the service required of a 
system.  In order to make this possible for heterogeneous systems, and to cope with complexity, a set of 
standards for Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) management  [1] have been developed.  They partition the 
overall management into areas of functional responsibility.  The main functional areas defined by OSI are: 
Configuration Management to control installation of both the hardware and software components within a 
distributed system or application; Performance Management, concerned with optimisation of performance to 
improve the service provided to users in terms of better throughput, response times or reliability, or to reduce 
operating costs; Fault Management, including detection, location and recovery from faults; Security 
Management to maintain the security mechanisms of the system, e.g. access control, encryption facilities and 
physical security; and Accounting, which records information on usage of resources and enables suppliers of 
services to charge for the use of those services.  In addition, Monitoring of state, errors, performance and usage 
information is needed in order to support all the above management functions, although it is not a standard OSI 
Systems Management function.   
The approach to distributed systems management, like that for any other management task, is to take action as 
far as possible on the basis of general policies, not of particular cases.  This implies the generation of policies 
which apply to abstractly defined situations, and to groups of components and users of the system rather than 
individual units.  For example the same policy may apply to all people in a department or to the set of files 
pertaining to an application.  The grouping of system objects into management domains, to which policies may 
refer, has been described in [2]. 
1.2. Paper Outline 
The paper covers its subject matter as follows.  Section 2 introduces the subject of policies and the need to 
provide a structured model of policies in order to analyse conflicts.  Section 3 describes our model of 
management action policies and their attributes.  The fundamental distinction between imperatival policies, 
which cause actions to be initiated, and authority policies, which give them the power to happen, is made.  
Policies may themselves be objects which are part of the system, and the operations which can be performed 
upon them are introduced.  The concept of the overlap of policies, which is crucial to the analysis of 
relationships between them, is defined.  Section 4 describes and analyses several kinds of policy conflict in terms 
of the possible types of policy overlap.  In section 5 some possible approaches to the resolution of conflicts are 
introduced.  Related work is described in section 6.  Finally, in section 7, conclusions are reached about the 
progress which has been made and the research tasks which remain.   
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2. POLICIES 
2.1. Management Policies 
All formal organisations have policies, which are defined in the dictionary as 'the plans of an organisation to 
meet its goals'.  They are the driving force behind management.  They have two related purposes: to define the 
goals of the organisation; and to allocate the resources to achieve the goals.  The policies are used as a means of 
management, in a hierarchical fashion.  A high-level policy guides a manager, who may achieve goals by making 
lower-level policies which apply to other managers lower in the hierarchy. 
Most organisations issue Policy Statements, intended to guide their members in particular circumstances.  
Policies may provide positive guidance about the goals of the organisation and how they are to be achieved, or 
constraints limiting the way in which the goals are to be achieved.  Other policy statements allocate (give access 
authority to) the resources which are needed to carry out the goals.  If they allocate money they are typically 
called Budgets. 
A common theme in distributed system management is the need for independent managers to be able to 
negotiate, establish, query and enforce policies which apply to a defined general set of situations. 
An example of interaction between independent managers arises from the interconnection of two network 
management domains such as a Public Network (PN) and a local Imperial College (IC) network.  This requires 
communication between the PN and IC network managers in order to exchange management information and 
establish access authority.  Let us suppose that there are two relevant policies in force:  PN policy gives the PN 
Manager the authority to carry out all relevant management operations on the network; and IC policy requires 
the IC Network Manager to report regularly to his users on the status of the academic subset of PN nodes.  We 
call these managers the subjects of the policies.  In the absence of any other policies, then the PN Manager has 
the authority to provide the regular status information, but no obligation to do so, while the IC Network Manager 
has the obligation to obtain the information but no authority to do so.  The initial situation is shown in figure 1a. 
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Figure 1  Policies for PN and IC Managers 
An additional policy has to be established (created) by the PN Manager to meet IC’s requirements.  One 
approach is to create an imperatival policy which causes the PN Manager himself to generate the status 
information and provide it to the IC Network Manager regularly, as shown in figure 1b.  An alternative approach 
is to create a policy which gives the IC Network Manager the authority to perform the operations needed to 
obtain the regular status information, as shown in figure 1c. 
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This example brings out one of the main points in the model.  Policies which cause activities to be initiated and 
policies giving authority to carry out activities can each exist independent of each other.  However, if only one of 
the two kinds of policies exists in relation to an action, the action will not be performed.  For management 
activities to be carried out, there needs to be a manager who is the subject of both kinds of policy: a policy 
giving authority to carry out the activity; and a policy causing him to do so. 
2.2. The Need to Model Policies 
We view the activity of system management as implementing the policies of the organisation(s) which run the 
system.  There is a need for a means by which independent managers can query, negotiate, set up and change 
policies.  It can of course be done by the well-tried method of telephone calls and the exchange of paper, but 
there are potential benefits in using the distributed system itself to communicate and store policies, particularly 
with respect to automated management.  Thus it must be possible to represent and manipulate policies within a 
computer system.  It is important that the representation of policies and the protocols used to negotiate them 
should be uniform across management applications.  An important factor in distributed system management is 
the potential benefit to be gained from computer-assisted support for it or even, in appropriate cases, its 
complete automation.   
With the automation of many aspects of management in distributed systems and computer networks, there is the 
need to represent management policy within the computer system so that it can be interpreted by automated 
managers in order to influence their activities.   
'Policy' is a very wide term, and there can be little hope of capturing all kinds of policy in a model.  We 
distinguish here between two particular kinds of policy, while recognising that there may be many others which 
are of neither kind.  Management action policies are the main kind which are of interest to distributed system 
management; briefly, they describe a persistent, positive or negative, imperative or authority for a set of policy 
subjects to achieve goals or actions on a set of target objects.  Human subjects or targets can be represented by 
software objects within the computer system. 
However, other policies cannot easily be fitted into this framework.  For example, the policy that 'the same person 
must not be authorised both to enter a payment and sign the payment cheque' cannot easily be modelled as a 
management action policy.  It is most easily described as a policy about management action policies (PAMAP 
policy), because two management action policies are in question: one authorising X to input accounts for 
payment, and the other  authorising X to approve accounts for payment.  The PAMAP policy is that the two 
management action policies must not coexist.  This example is considered further in section 4.5. 
We do not at present know how to model PAMAP policies usefully, and so where we need to describe one we 
have to step 'outside the model'.  This is not important at present because there is still a great deal of work still to 
be done exploring ordinary management action policies and their relationships.  However, in the long term this is 
a significant limitation which will need to be overcome. 
2.3. Policy Conflicts 
A dictionary definition of conflict is 'opposition, difference, disagreement', and we will use this as a general 
guide.  There are several well-known phrases describing policy conflicts.  Conflict of interests describes a 
situation where a single person has tasks relating to two different enterprises, and carrying out both together 
conscientiously may be impossible.  Conflict of duties is the dual situation; it describes a failure of the control 
principle of separation of duties requiring at least two different people to be involved in carrying out important 
transactions.  Conflict of priorities occurs when the resources available are not sufficient to meet the demands 
upon them.  Other forms of conflict are more primitive, and are typically (but not always!) avoided by human 
managers, for example: an action is simultaneously authorised and forbidden; or, someone has a duty to carry 
out an action which is forbidden. 
Human managers recognise, avoid and resolve conflicts by a combination of formal and intuitive rules and by 
informal negotiation.  They do not always do it very well.  Automated systems are forced into a much more 
formal approach and there can, at worst, be a complete failure of the system if conflicts are not dealt with 
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correctly.  This paper is an exploration of how far it is possible to use our model of policies to analyse conflicts 
with a view to their prevention, identification and resolution. 
3. A MANAGEMENT POLICY MODEL 
3.1. Characteristics of Management Action Policies 
We define some characteristics of the policies which we will be discussing in order to give a working definition 
which is more precise than simply ‘plans’.  We start from the basis that policies are intended to influence actions.  
However, policies are not concerned with instant decisions to perform an action, instantly carried out.  If a 
manager specifies that something is to be done once only, and instantly, e.g. an order 'Shut the door!', he does 
not create a policy, but simply causes the action to be carried out.  Our definition of policy requires it to have 
persistence, whether because it defines a single future action or repeated actions, or because it relates to the 
continuing maintenance of a condition.   
3.1.1. Policy Modalities - Imperatival and Authority 
As shown in the example above, we distinguish between policies which are intended as imperatives to initiate 
actions, and policies which give or withhold authority for actions to take place.  Actions are operations which are 
performed by agents on target objects provided two preconditions are satisfied: imperative and authority: 
• Imperatival policies are those which cause actions to be initiated (or deterred).  A common form of 
imperative is an obligation which is undertaken by the agent, and many of our examples refer to 
obligations as a form of imperative; 
• Authority policies are those which cause actions to be given authority to be carried out.   
Figure 2 illustrates our view of the world.  Agents are objects which interpret and apply imperatival policies of 
which they are the subjects.  Whenever the conditions of these policies apply, the agent initiates an action, 
directed to a target object .  However, the action will only operate if it is authorised; a reference monitor 
intercepts all initiated actions and only allows them to proceed (authorises them) if the applicable authority 
policies permit this.  The authorised action operates upon the target object. 
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Figure 2  The Roles of Imperatival and Authority Policies 
3.1.2. Policy Attributes 
Policies, whether concerned with imperatives or with authority, have at least the following attributes: modality; 
policy subjects; policy target objects; policy goals; and policy constraints.  We use a standard graphical 
convention for illustrating policies (omitting constraints), as shown in figure 3.  It will be seen that, for graphical 
convenience, the subjects and target objects are shown in standard Venn diagram convention, while the set of 
goals is shown as a list attached to the policy modality.  We use the convention that subjects are represented by 
squares and target objects by triangles. 
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Figure 3  A Management Action Policy 
Modality 
A policy has one of the following modalities: positive authority (permitting), negative authority (forbidding), 
positive imperatival (requiring or obliging), and negative imperatival (deterring).  We do not exclude the 
possibility of other useful policy modalities being proposed, but these are adequate for the present analysis.  As 
mentioned above, we regard an obligation as a special form of imperative. 
Policy Subjects and Target Objects 
Policies are about organisational goals, which need someone to achieve them.  All policies in this model have a 
policy subjects attribute which defines a set of users.  The policy subjects are the people to whom the policy is 
directed, i.e. who have the imperative or authority to carry out the policy goal within the limits defined by the 
policy constraints.  Where a policy has been automated as a computer system command we regard the user who 
will input the system command as the policy subject.  Note that many policies are by implication directed to all 
users, possibly constrained by some predicate, and the value of the policy subjects attribute is then the set of all 
users. 
The policy target objects attribute defines the set of objects at which the policy is directed.   
The sets of policy subjects and target objects may each be specified either by enumeration or by means of a 
predicate which is to be satisfied.  Individual policy subjects and target objects are not normally specified, 
because a policy is typically expressed in terms of organisational positions and domains of objects, not 
individuals.  One approach to specifying organisational positions and enumerating groups of objects is by using 
management domains; see [2]. 
It should be noted that, although the subjects of both imperatival and authority policies are defined as sets, the 
typical set membership is likely to be different.  The set of subjects of an authority policy simply describes who 
has the power to perform actions, and no problems arise if there is a large number of members of the set.  On the 
other hand, the set of subjects of a imperatival policy will typically consist of one member only, because usually 
actions are performed by one person, and when the same goal is allocated to more than one, conflict may result.  
It may be appropriate for the subject set to be defined as a position, e.g. Security Administrator, with more than 
one member, but it will then be necessary for members of the position to coordinate between themselves to avoid 
conflict.  This is discussed further below in section 4.6. 
Policy Goals  
The policy goals attributes can be expressed as a high-level goal which specifies what the manager should 
achieve in abstract terms which do not identify how to achieve the goals.  Alternatively the goals can be refined 
to a set of more concrete actions which specify how to achieve the required goal. Actions are specified in terms 
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of an alphabet of operations which can be performed on objects in the system, and so are amenable to automated 
interpretation.  
An example of a high level goal is 'Department Ds' managers must protect department D's files from loss due to 
fire or media failure'.  This can be refined  into the following set of actions: 
i) The system is to run a backup program to archive files on Department D's file server to cartridge tape 
every night at 22.00; 
ii) The duty operator is to take the cartridge tape to off-site safe storage every morning at 08.00. 
A high-level goal can be refined into many alternative sets of actions.   The process of refining a goal to a set of 
actions is similar to refining a set of requirements into the detailed design of a computer program.  
Note that a high-level authorisation policy such as the 'computer manager has authority to order computer 
equipment' will be refined into a set of lower level policies which authorise the manager to perform specific 
operations on system objects, e.g.: 
 read budget; 
 read suppliers; 
 new order_transaction; 
 query payments_made. 
There is no inherent ordering relationship between these permitted operations. 
Policy Constraints 
The Policy Constraints attribute of a policy object places constraints on its applicability.  They are predicates 
which may be expressed in terms of general system properties, such as extent or duration, or some other 
condition.  An example of constraints in authority policies expressed by access rules is the limits on the terminal 
from which the operation may be performed, and/or limits on date or time, for example 'Members of Payroll are 
permitted to Read Payroll Master files, from terminals in the Payroll office, between 9 am and 5 pm, Monday to 
Friday'. 
3.2. Representing Management Action Policies as Objects 
It is  useful to view management action policies as objects on which operations can be performed.  For simplicity 
we assume the following minimal set of operations: 
• Create a policy; 
• Destroy a policy; 
• Query a policy. 
Authority may be required to perform operations on policy objects.  If the computer system is simply a 
documentation aid, no restrictions may be needed.  On the other hand, if the policies are actually used to 
influence system actions, as in the case of access control policies, restrictions on operations are required.  They 
are discussed in detail for authority policies in [3].   
The advantage of representing policies as explicit objects which are interpreted by managers is that it is easier to 
determine what policies exist and to change them.  If necessary, policies can be made read-only to prevent 
change.  However, many systems define policy implicitly by coding it into the implementation of the system or 
the manager components.  Even if it is necessary to encode a policy into an implementation as the only practical 
means to implement certain policies, there should still be a (high level) policy object to explicitly specify the 
policy so that it does not get changed with a new release of the system without realising there has been a 
change of policy.  
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3.3. Overlapping Policies 
Our model of management action policies represents both subjects and target objects as sets of objects.  The 
overlap relationship between sets of objects exists when their intersection is non-empty, as shown in figure 4.   
 
Figure 4  Overlapping Sets 
Overlap is crucial to our discussion of policy conflicts as it is our contention that without some kind of overlap 
between the objects in two policies there can be no conflict between them.  We analyse conflicts below using 
the kind of overlap as our first level of classification.  There are several possibilities for overlap between policies, 
corresponding to various combinations of overlap between objects in the subject and target object sets of the 
policies: 
• Double overlap - both the subjects and the target objects of the two policies overlap; 
• Subjects overlap; 
• Target objects overlap; 
• Subjects - Targets overlap - the subjects of one policy and the target objects of another policy overlap.   
Overlap of some kind is of course the prerequisite for many kinds of relationship between polices which do not 
involve conflict.  Here are some examples in which the target objects attributes of policies overlap but there is no 
conflict:  
• Authority hierarchies.  Many organisations have a well-defined authority hierarchy.  When a high level 
manager delegates authority to subordinate managers, this is usually a partitioning of the target objects 
into subsets assigned to different managers.  Obviously the target object set, in the policy which gives 
authority to the higher level manager, overlaps with the target object sets which have been delegated to 
the subordinate managers.  Conflict is avoided by an imperatival policy deterring the higher level manager 
from exercising control over the delegated targets, except possibly in case of failure of a subordinate 
manager. 
• Imperatival policy hierarchies.  When a high level imperatival policy is refined into more concrete lower 
level policies or sets of actions (as described in section 3.1), there is obviously overlap between the target 
objects of higher and lower level policies.  This does not lead to conflict as only the more concrete lower 
level policies will actually be translated into action by managers. 
• Responsibility.  As pointed out by Kanger [4] there is a distinction between responsibility for and 
responsibility to, when discussing a goal to achieved.  We think that it is likely to be useful to analyse the 
concept of responsibility into two separate imperatival policies which both apply to the same set of target 
objects.  The two policies would have as their subjects, respectively, the manager who is responsible for 
achieving the goal, and the manager to whom the first manager is responsible.  This is the subject of 
current research. 
4. MANAGEMENT ACTION POLICY CONFLICTS 
Management action policy conflicts are not yet well understood, and we do not claim in this paper to describe all 
possible kinds of conflict.  However, the policy model has opened up the possibility of systematic analysis of 
policy conflicts.  This analysis is at an early stage, but a first step has been taken by recognising that the overlap 
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of objects – either or both of policy subjects and target objects – between policies is a necessary condition for 
conflict.  If there are no objects at all in common between two policies, there is no possibility of conflict.  
We classify conflicts as shown in figure 5.  The major distinction is between conflict of modalities and conflict of 
goals.  Conflicts of modalities can be recognised without reference to the meaning of the policy goal, whereas 
conflicts of goals depend upon the semantics of the goal, or are application-dependent. 
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Figure 5  Classification of Policy Conflicts 
4.1. Positive -Negative Conflict of Modalities 
Direct positive-negative conflict is shown in figure 6.  It requires a triple overlap of target objects, subjects and 
goals.  It occurs when a subject is both authorised and forbidden for the same goal on an object, or both 
required and deterred: for example 'The Accounts Supervisor is permitted to sign payment cheques' and also  
'The Accounts Supervisor is forbidden to sign payment cheques'.  This conflict is very serious, as there is no 
means of deciding whether the action is to be permitted (or initiated, depending on the modality); unless there is 
some means of resolution this could lead to a deadlocked situation if the conflict were encountered in an 
automated system.  Conflicts of this kind in access control (authority) policies are discussed in [5].   
GoalA
Either Authority or 
Imperative
X Y
 
Figure 6  Direct Positive -Negative Conflict of Policy Modalities 
Note that this conflict can be detected without understanding the semantics of the particular goal; we can 
immediately recognise that the following two statements are in conflict: 
a) X is obliged (/authorised) to achieve GoalA on Y. 
b) X is obliged not (/forbidden) to achieve GoalA on Y. 
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4.2. Conflict between Imperatival and Authority Policies 
Conflict between imperatival and authority policies is shown in figure 7.  It also requires a triple overlap of target 
objects, subjects and goals.  It occurs when a subject is both required to initiate and forbidden to carry out an 
action on an object: for example 'The Accounts Supervisor is obliged to sign all payment cheques which have 
been approved by the Accounting Manager' and also  'The Accounts Supervisor is forbidden to sign payment 
cheques'.  This conflict is less serious because the question of whether the action is to be carried out is settled 
unambiguously; although it is initiated as a result of the imperatival policy, it will be prevented when the 
reference monitor intercepts it, because of the negative authority policy (see figure 2).  However, it is at least 
strange if someone is simultaneously obliged and forbidden to do an action.  At best this is a temporary 
situation, e.g. reflecting a partially completed organisational change.  At worst the work of the organisation may 
be brought to a halt. 
GoalAX Y -ve Authority - Forbidden
+ve Imperative - Obliged
 
Figure 7  Conflict between Imperatival and Negative Authority Policies 
This conflict too can be detected without any application knowledge at all; we can immediately recognise that 
the following two statements are in conflict: 
a) X is obliged to carry out ActionA on Y. 
b) X is forbidden to carry out ActionA on Y. 
There is of course also the complementary situation, in which a subject is authorised to achieve a goal on an 
object, but deterred from doing it.  We do not regard this as a conflict at all, because it is commonplace to give a 
manager powers but instruct him not to use them until some future situation arises.  However, it is not in general 
a good thing for subjects to have unnecessary powers, and it is therefore good management practice to detect 
this situation as part of the management monitoring activity. 
4.3. Conflict of Priorities for Resources 
The situation of conflicting requirements for a limited or single resource is familiar wherever concurrent access 
may be attempted, e.g. in database systems.  This is a conflict (or contention) between actions, not policies.  
There is also a familiar situation of competition within an organisation for resource budgets, which may be 
viewed as a particular kind of authority policy.  However, we are not attempting to model contention or 
competition in this paper.   
There is one area of conflict for resources where the policy model may be able to help, although our analysis is at 
an early stage.  Commodity resources are resources which have a quantity associated with them, rather than 
being atomic, so that they can be partially used.  Examples are money, time, and memory or disc space.  Typical 
operations that can be performed upon them are use and replenish, parameterised by a quantity.  So if a 
particular money resource has a value of £400 and the operation use(300) is performed on it, its value afterwards 
will be £100. 
Casual reading of a number of organisations' policy statements suggests that many of them are intended to 
initiate the spending of money or use of other resources.  Clearly when two or more policies between them 
require the use of more resource than is available, there is a conflict for resources .  This is shown by two 
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imperatival policies whose goals are each use and whose target object is the same money resource.  This is 
shown in figure 8.  Further progress on this area of conflict requires a better understanding of how to represent 
commodity resources in computer systems.  Varley [6] provides some discussion of them. 
Use
X
Y
 
Figure 8  Conflict for Resources 
4.4. Conflict of Duties 
When two positive authority policies are in the double overlap relationship, in which both the subjects and the 
target objects of the two policies overlap, there is the possibility that a subject can perform two operations, 
which are defined by the application as conflicting, upon an object.  This is described as a conflict of duties, 
more familiarly known as a failure of the control principle of separation of duties described by Clark & Wilson [7].  
See figure 9a for the general case; figure 9b illustrates a special case, perhaps more common, in which the two 
conflicting operations occur in a single authority policy.  An example of the principle is 'The same person must 
not be allowed both to enter a payment and sign the payment cheque' .  This is a PAMAP policy, which would 
be violated by two such policies as ‘The Accounts Supervisor is authorised to enter payment information’ and 
‘The Accounts Supervisor is authorised to sign payment cheques’, unless further restrictions are applied. 
Application knowledge is required to tell whether two goals can give rise to a conflict of duties.  If conflicts of 
this kind are to be recognised in a system, it is necessary to set up a table of pairs of goals which are declared to 
be in conflict. 
Enter
X
Sign
Enter
X Sign
a) Conflict of Duties between two Policies b) Conflict of Duties within a Policy
 
Figure 9  Potential Conflict of Duties 
A conflict of duties arises if both subjects and targets of two policies overlap (treating the two goals of figure 9b 
as two separate policies).  The absence of subject overlap is a sufficient condition to enforce separation of 
duties, and Clark and Wilson discuss this in more detail.  Brewer, Nash & Poland [8, 9] discuss how the 
condition may safely be relaxed further; they would characterise the absence of subject overlap as a static 
separation of duties, and they describe methods of dynamic separation of duties which are more flexible in 
operation. 
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4.5. Conflict of Interests 
When the subjects of two authority policies overlap, this implies that the same subject can perform management 
tasks on two different sets of targets.  See figure 10.  In some application-defined circumstances there is a 
conflict, known as a conflict of interests .  The best example of this is when a merchant bank is acting as adviser 
to two different organisations, e.g. on a takeover bid for one client while advising other clients on investment 
decisions which would be influenced by knowledge of the takeover.  There is a public policy (PAMAP) 
forbidding the use of this knowledge, and declaring the situation to be one of conflict. 
Takeover 
AdviceMerchant 
Bank
Investment  
Advice
ClientA
ClientB
 
Figure 10  Potential Conflict of Interests 
4.6. Multiple Managers 
When the target objects of two policies, of either mode, overlap, there is a potential conflict arising from multiple 
managers of a single object, when the goals of the policies are semantically incompatible.  For example, if the 
'Maintain' operation on a computer entails taking it out of service, and the 'Schedule' operation requires it to be in 
service, any two policies which oblige subjects to do both simultaneously are in direct conflict.  See figure 11.   
Y
Maintain
Schedule
 
Figure 11  Multiple Managers 
There is also a potential conflict arising from multiple managers having authority over the same object, but this is 
often tolerated.  In some cases multiple managers of an object are forbidden on the grounds of potential conflict, 
e.g. generally each worker has one line manager.  In other cases it is positively encouraged, e.g. there are 
normally at least two people with security administrator authority for a computer system, to cover sickness and 
holiday absences. 
The conflicts which arise from multiple managers being authorised to operate upon a single target object are 
often controlled by ensuring that there is no simultaneous conflict of obligations.  The way in which Security 
Administrators cooperate is by coordinating their obligations; the backup Security Administrator normally has 
no obligation to use his authority, and will refer requests for action to the primary Security Administrator.  
However, when the primary is unavailable, the backup's imperatival policy becomes activated and gives him the 
obligation to take action.  When this sort of coordination is carried out between humans, it may be informal and 
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even unformulated, but when the managers are automated it is necessary to formalise the way in which the 
obligations are controlled, by ensuring that the relevant imperatival policy only applies to one subject at a time. 
Another source of multiple management is mentioned in [2].  If the same real-world object, e.g. a computer, is 
represented by two different software objects, e.g. in scheduling and maintenance applications, then there can 
be interference between the two applications which cannot be dealt with by the system.  For example, if the 
maintenance system has caused the computer to go into a disabled state, there is no possibility for it to be 
scheduled.  This kind of conflict may be serious, because it is undetectable and unresolvable within the 
computer system.  It can only be dealt with at the design stage, by ensuring that multiple representations of real-
world objects are avoided. 
4.7. Self-Management 
The final situation to be mentioned is when the subjects of one policy overlap with the target objects of another 
policy.  We do not know of any interesting conflicts which arise from this kind of overlap when the two policies 
are different, but when this applies within a single authority policy there occurs the possibility of self-
management.  The situation is of a manager managing himself.  See figure 12.  This is again a potential conflict 
which is application-dependent; it may be acceptable for an automated manager to configure itself, but not for a 
human manager to sign his own expenses. 
Approve 
expenses
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Figure 12  Self-Management 
5. RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS 
As observed above, the degree of importance to the resolution of conflicts varies widely.  At one end of the 
scale, it is essential that direct positive-negative modality conflicts should be prevented or that a method of 
immediate resolution is available.  At the other end, many conflicts of duties are tolerated indefinitely. 
There are several different levels at which conflicts can be prevented or resolved: 
• At the highest level, the language used for system description may be designed to prevent an unresolved 
conflict arising at all, e.g. our approach to prevention of authority conflicts in this section. 
• Conflicts may be detected off-line by a compiler or some other pre-processor.  Type checkers (now) and 
automatic proof systems (when they exist) detect inconsistencies in specifications and programs.  
Potential conflicts of interest may be detected by application-specific tools which are aware of conflicting 
goals.  The (human) developer can then resolve these conflicts off-line. 
• Potential conflicts may be detected on-line in advance, and prevented.  For instance, one form of conflict 
of duties could be prevented by restricting the domain of subjects of an authority policy to a single 
member at any moment. 
• Actual conflicting actions may be detected at the time that they occur.  Another way of dealing with 
conflict of duties could be by detecting that an action is being performed which reverses an action carried 
out by another subject.  It would be an application-specific decision whether to prevent the action or 
simply to raise a warning to allow the (human) user to resolve the problem. 
We discuss two specific approaches to conflict resolution. 
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5.1. Resolving Positive -Negative Authority Conflicts 
Direct positive-negative conflicts must be prevented or resolved.  For example, authority conflicts are prevented 
in [10] by means of a two-level priority scheme.  The default, low priority, authority for any action is negative, so 
that in the absence of explicit positive authority no action is permitted.  Explicit authority policies always express 
positive authority, with high priority.  They cannot conflict with each other, as there is no conflict involved in 
authorising an action twice over.  They always have precedence over the default negative authority, so the 
'conflict' between the default and explicit policies is always resolved.   
Mandatory and Discretionary Security, are two forms of security defined by the Department of Defense (USA) 
[11].  Mandatory Security is always expressed as a negative authority policy, and Discretionary Security may be 
expressed by a positive authority policy.  When they conflict, there is a PAMAP policy (see section 2.2) that the 
negative authority of the Mandatory Security policy has higher priority and overrides the positive authority of 
the Discretionary Security policy.  Implicitly, a three-level priority scheme is used to ensure conflict-free policies 
in this situation: low priority negative default policy; medium priority positive discretionary authority policies; 
and high priority negative mandatory authority policies. 
5.2. Resolving Authority Conflicts by Imperatival Policies 
As discussed in section 4.6, on multiple managers, an authority conflict can in some circumstances be dealt with 
by ensuring that the associated imperatival policies are coordinated.  Potentially conflicting actions between two 
authorisation policies may be prevented by ensuring that the respective subjects are not simultaneously obliged 
to perform them .  For example, the maintenance manager may be authorised to disable a computer and the 
scheduler to schedule it.  If the first occurs it will be impossible for the second to be carried out.  The conflict can 
be resolved by ensuring that imperatival policies for the maintenance manager and the scheduler are not in force 
simultaneously.   
It depends entirely upon the application whether this method of conflict resolution is satisfactory.  In the case of 
multiple managers, e.g. two people acting in the security administrator role, it is a commonly adopted technique 
of resolution.  In other cases it is impossible to be sure that a subject is deterred.  In relation to conflict of 
interests and human agents, it is well known that negative imperatival policies have frequently failed to prevent 
actions in breach of them; policies which remove the authority, not simply the imperative, may be necessary. 
6. DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK 
6.1. Human or Automated Managers? 
In the above discussions we have not distinguished between human and automated managers.  We assume that 
automated managers are 'well behaved' and always perform the goals specified by imperatival policies, whereas 
human managers always have freedom of choice and may refuse to carry out an obligation for whatever reason.  
We have not attempted to model this freedom of choice and instead assume 'good behaviour' of both automated 
and human managers. 
We assume humans are represented within the computer system by a persistent 'user representation' object for 
which policies can be specified.  When a person logs into the system, an active object (software process) is 
created to interface to the person's workstation, and this object 'inherits' all policies specified for the user 
representation object.  Initiation of an action can be represented by the human typing in a command, which will 
only be performed if the human subject has authority for it. 
We have not yet attempted to make any formal analysis of the implications of the difference between human and 
automated managers, nor are aware of any publications doing so.  However, a more detailed analysis than this 
will need to explore the distinction. 
6.2. Sociological Approaches 
The heart of our model is the categorisation of policies into imperatival and authority policies.  We have not seen 
this distinction made elsewhere in relation to the explicit discussion of policies outside computer systems, in a 
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sociological context.  This may be because it is only in automated systems that it is possible to force such a 
simple dichotomy onto a naturally complicated world.  There are approximately eight definitions of 'policy' in [12], 
with varying mixtures of flavour of imperative and authority.  Most are biased towards imperatives, not all of 
which could be described as 'obligations'.  Only one clearly emphasises authority.  This book discusses policy 
conflicts entirely from the point of view of power struggles between opposing parties (often political parties) 
attempting to impose or frustrate the imposition of policies. 
Star [13] uses a sociological approach to the subject.  The concept of due process is used – the incorporation of 
differing viewpoints for decision-making in a fair and flexible manner.  Sociological analysis of organisational 
problem solving in scientific communities yields the concept of boundary objects which are put forward as being 
a sufficiently plastic data structure for adopting differing viewpoints while maintaining continuity of identity.  
Clearly boundary objects have some similarity to the domains which we use for grouping objects to which 
policies refer, but there is not yet any evidence of how well they can be formalised. 
6.3. Computer-Related Work 
Bruggeman [14] discusses rights in an object-oriented environment, and analyses the conflicts which may arise 
when two elementary rights have the same object but different permission tags and the same priority.  His 'basic 
conflict' corresponds to our positive-negative conflict of modalities, and he also notes the existence of 'latent 
conflicts', where the basic conflict has no immediate effect because of another right with a higher priority. 
Wand & Woo [15] attempt to analyse conflict by interpreting it to mean a situation where it is  impossible to 
resolve which of two possible stable states is to be chosen.  This seems possibly suitable for the discussion of 
conflicts where two parties are putting forward different points of view and cannot decide between them, e.g. 
positive-negative conflicts.  However, other conflicts are less suited to this approach. 
Michael et al [16] address the problem of introducing precision into natural language security policies by treating 
them as a set of logical axioms and attempting to derive theorems from them.  Policy conflicts are then 
represented by inconsistencies between the axioms.  Many of the inconsistencies between the policies in a case 
study derived from the assumptions about real-world knowledge which are embedded in natural language.  The 
conflicts were not formally categorised.  The use of a theorem prover, similar in principle to the use of Prolog, 
appears a useful approach to the identification of possible conflicts in a large system. 
An area which  is related to policy conflicts, though not referring to it directly, is the use of contracts as a model 
for cooperation in distributed problem-solving.  Smith & Davis [17] achieved task-sharing by using contracts, 
explicit agreements between nodes that generate a task (the manager) and nodes willing to execute the task (the 
contractor).  The approach in ISTAR [18], an Integrated Project Support Environment, is to use contracts as the 
model for activities in the software development process.  Each activity is conducted by a ‘contractor’ (e.g. a 
programmer), for a ‘client’ (e.g. a manager).  It has precisely defined deliverables and acceptance criteria, and 
other contractual conditions.   
6.4. Deontic Logic 
The work which is closest in spirit to ours is in  deontic logics, the logics of normative systems.  These logics 
have operators which denote obligation and permission, either of states or actions.  These operators correspond 
roughly to our own use of similar terms.   
There are, however, differences of emphasis which have led us deliberately to retain different terminology.  At a 
philosophical level, some people follow Kant's belief that 'ought' implies 'can' more or less strongly.  Many 
flavours of deontic logic actually have the axiom that obligation implies permission, or even define them 
interchangeably, e.g. permission for an action means being not obliged to refrain from the action.  By contrast, 
we wish to couple imperatives and authority rather loosely.  It is obviously of interest when there is a imperatival 
policy for an unauthorised goal, but it is a common situation in human organisations for the goals to be set up 
before the resources to achieve them have been marshalled, e.g. when a company prospectus is issued.   
Some more recent work overcomes these limitations.  Wieringa et al [19] define obligation and permission 
independently; in their logic permission implies possibility, but does not imply obligation.  Alchourron [20] also 
 16 12/4/93 
defines obligation and permission independently; the possibility of obligation without permission is explicitly 
discussed, and characterised as 'inconsistent norming'.  One could describe the equivalent situation for us as 
'inconsistent policy-making'.  Hage [21] deals with consistency of rules, which is closely related.   
One issue which we are aware of, but have not resolved, is the logical status of policies.  Alchourron makes the 
distinction between the logic of normative propositions and the logic of the norms themselves.  As observed by 
Wieringa et al [22] there are two ways of interpreting ‘It is forbidden to park here’.  It may be the observation 
that a rule exists or the promulgation of the rule itself.  One is a proposition with a truth value, while the other is 
a norm with the effect of a command.  If we are to attempt to formulate a logic of policies – a task for the future – 
should it be a logic of propositions, of norms, or of both? 
It is our intuition that the path of deontic logic is the correct one to follow if we wish to set up a theory of 
policies on a sound basis, but we cannot claim to have made much progress yet. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has given an outline of our approach to the formalisation of management policies and then used this 
formalisation as a framework for the analysis of conflicts between policies.  The different ways in which policy 
overlap can occur have been found to correspond closely to the informal intuitive classification of policies. 
In the long run, automation of the detection and resolution of policy conflicts will be essential for effective 
automated distributed system management; if it were necessary to invoke human intervention for every potential 
or actual conflict, much of the benefit of automation would be lost.  However, progress needs to be made on at 
least three fronts before this idea can be a reality. 
First, a detailed knowledge of the application functions of distributed system management is needed.  We have 
presented our examples in this paper on the basis of what is intuitive and familiar.  Only when we know what 
actual conflicts arise can we be sure of the areas which need most attention. 
Second, progress needs to be made on the generic formalisation of policies.  It must be formal, because then it 
will be possible to treat it rationally, whether by creating simulation models or by reasoning in a formal logic.  It 
must also be generic, because all kinds of policy have to fit into a compatible framework if conflicts between 
them are to be discussed. 
Third, practical implementations of the theoretical model must be created and developed.  Work has started on 
this in projects such as Domino [23] but there is a long way to go before it yields its benefits. 
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